accountantsworld 作者：
当注册会计师所审计的的财务报表本身已经由于欺诈行为而被歪曲，注册会计师或多或少要负点责任。

60年代的Billy Sol用他并不存在的化肥槽做抵押来获得他永远也无法偿还的贷款。他的做法很简单，注册会计师周一在Amarillo稽核过的化肥槽连夜运到Lubbock，这样当注册会计师周二赶到Lubbock的时候，化肥槽又被计算一遍。诸如此类的小伎俩却让债券人受到数以百万计的损失。
注册会计师们为什么不在不同地区同时进行审计？原因也许是他们过于相信他们的客户。可是注册会计师们又能相信谁呢？

还是在这个10年，四季护理中心将一批建筑合同的收入确认入帐，而该合同根本从未动工。物料采购来并存放在施工地点， 四周用篱笆围着。而AA的注册会计师们认为没必要去施工现场，、他们仅仅依靠使用完工百分比法来计算成本和收益。尽管这在技术上是合法的， 但这夸大了收入，当这一事实被披露时， 该公司股价大跌。媒体宣称注册会计师被欺骗了，而注册会计师们却说他们的做法无可厚非。

70年代，一位名叫Diangelis的男士使用了类似Billoy的做法来欺骗注册会计师，他利用管道把色拉油在不同地区的容器间移动，这样注册会计师便把一件资产多次计算。注册会计师们又一次被愚弄了。
他们为什么没有考虑到这些可能性并使用有效手段来保证正确稽核存货呢？回答就是， 注册会计师们那时不需要这么做。而当他们在另一些案例中发现了类似问题时，他们却说那不过是与GAAP有关的一个可笑的意外。

以上三个经典骗局有两个是注册会计师由于客户的欺诈行为而出具错误意见。而“四季护理中心”的解体与安然丑闻类似。“四季”公司的会计对收入的确认不符合逻辑，且就GAAP而言过于牵强。 对于此类欺骗，公众投资者实际上是无法避免的。
安然事件让我们看到了对所谓“特殊目的实体”概念的滥用。其财务信息的披露是显失逻辑且牵强的。
这就是在不断变化的欺诈的表现形式。通常这些欺诈是通过利用诸如独立注册会计师或政府代办（如调查员）来完成的。他们或者由于涉足咨询服务而使其专业判断受到蒙蔽，或者由于政治压力而表现为执行无力。

有人说注册会计师通过帮助客户规避法令来获得收益而使公众利益受到了侵害。这一说法在安然余震中并不鲜闻。但这是否就意味着行业自律已失效？决不为了保证行业自律，必须不受政治因素的影响，
同时任何准则制定机构必须拥有一定数量的非CPA成员，他们通过制定明确的披露规则，规范事务所从业人员的工作，又或是推行审计轮换制来保护公众利益。

注册会计师必须保持其客观和独立。一个有效的限制是要求审计人员在离开事务所的一段时间内不得在其审计客户公司就职。

注册会计师行业必须迅速有效的应对安然丑闻，但更重要的是通过有效的管理行业自律来恢复公众信心。(感谢视野网友robbie编译)

The Face of Fraud
What Does Fraud Look Like?

Auditors have always been held responsible, one way or another, when a financial statement on which they have opined turns out to be distorted by fraud.

In the 1960s, Billy Sol Estes pledged fertilizer tanks he didn’t have as collateral for loans he couldn’t repay. He fooled the auditors by moving the tanks at night to new locations so that the tanks the auditors counted on Monday in Amarillo were also counted on Tuesday in Lubbock, etc. Illegal and deceitful . . . clearly dishonest. Creditors lost millions. Why didn’t the auditors control all locations at the same time for a comprehensive count? Hindsight, of course is 20-20, but the reason may have been because they trusted their client. Should auditors trust anybody?

Later in that decade, Four Seasons Nursing Centers recognized earnings from construction contracts on which no work had been done. Materials had been purchased and stored on the job sites, protected by chain link fence. Their auditors (Arthur Andersen, for what it’s worth) saw no reason to visit job sites, relying instead on a mechanical calculation that recognized profit on the percentage of completion method by including costs of materials stored on the job sites in a cost-to cost calculation. Technically legal, but it overstated earnings and, when discovered, led to a precipitous decline in the stock price. Newspaper headlines vilified the auditors for their gullibility. The auditors said there was nothing wrong with applying the cost-to-cost method in a mechanical fashion. Financial analysts ( and a federal judge) said that was hogwash.

In the 1970s, a Mr. DiAngelis fooled his auditors by moving salad oil from tank to tank through a complex web of pipes so that they “observed” the same oil several times. Once again, Illegal and deceitful. . . clearly dishonest. Why didn’t the auditors consider that possibility and design procedures to detect any attempt to mess with the inventory? The short answer is that auditors were not then required to design procedures to detect fraud. In those cases where they did discover something amiss, it was just a happy accident associated with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards - - so they said.

Two of these three classic frauds involved deceiving the auditors; one did not. The Four Seasons debacle is not that much different from Enron. In Four Seasons, the accountants accepted an earnings number based on an illogical and strained interpretation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The investing public is virtually defenseless against this type of deceit. The evidence in Enron is clearly indicating serious abuse of so called “special purpose entities” - - arguably a strained and illogical application of disclosure rules. This is the changing face of fraud. Fraud now is often accomplished by co-opting the watchdog, whether an independent auditor, whose judgment is clouded by profits from consulting engagements, or a government agency (think meat inspectors) that can be rendered ineffective by political pressure.

One might argue that when auditors can profit by helping their client skirt the rules, the public interest is not protected. We will hear a lot of that as one result of the Enron mess. Does that mean self-regulation does not work? Hardly! But self-regulation must be free from political influence and any standard setting body must have a majority of non-CPA members dedicated to protecting the public interest by adopting clear disclosure rules, by prohibiting certain kinds of work by a company’s auditors, and – perhaps – by requiring auditor rotation. An auditor is much more likely to retain objectivity, and avoid cronyism, if he or she knows that his work will be available to another firm within a year or two, and no amount of client pleasing rule twisting can change the rotation. Another useful restriction would be to prohibit an auditor from accepting employment with an audit client for a period of time after terminating employment with the auditing firm.

The CPA profession must respond quickly and effectively to deal with the Enron scandal, but more importantly, to take control of the self-regulation process and restore public confidence.

原文发表http://www.accountantsworld.com

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